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Abstract 
 
PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION DISTORTION OF TRIAL EVIDENCE: BIASED 
PROCESING UNDER PERSUASION 
 
Lindsay D. Marshall 
B.S., College of Charleston 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
M.B.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Andrew R. Smith 
 
 
The distortion of information during decision making has been investigated in a 
number of contexts.  In order to facilitate distortion, these investigations have traditionally 
not been in persuasive settings nor involved information that strongly favored the selection of 
one choice over another.  A study was conducted that addresses the absence of empirical 
investigation into how information is distorted during decision processes in persuasive 
situations.  The context of the courtroom was used, as legal proceedings have both persuasive 
and information processing components.  Participants saw numerous pieces of evidence: 
some of the evidence strongly favored a verdict of guilty; some favored a verdict of not 
guilty; and other evidence favored neither.  Whether participants saw evidence that favored a 
verdict of guilty or not guilty as the first piece of evidence was manipulated.  Some 
participants were told the evidence came from the prosecution or the defense while others 
were not.  Results indicated that participants distorted information in the direction of the 
persuasive evidence presented first, regardless of whether or not they were told the source of 
	  v 
the evidence.  A general reluctance to render a guilty verdict was also observed as roughly 
74% of participants selected a verdict of not guilty.   Perhaps because of participants’ 
reluctance to find the defendant guilty, the strong evidence location manipulation did not 
affect participants’ verdict in the case—despite the finding that the manipulation affected 
evidence evaluation and evidence evaluation was correlated with participants’ verdict.  
Overall, this study demonstrated that information is distorted in predictable ways, even when 
presented in a persuasive context and when the information strongly favored the selection of 
one option over the other. 
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Abstract 
The distortion of information during decision making has been investigated in a number of 
contexts.  In order to facilitate distortion, these investigations have traditionally not been in 
persuasive settings nor involved information that strongly favored the selection of one choice 
over another.  A study was conducted that addresses the absence of empirical investigation 
into how information is distorted during decision processes in persuasive situations.  The 
context of the courtroom was used, as legal proceedings have both persuasive and 
information processing components.  Participants saw numerous pieces of evidence: some of 
the evidence strongly favored a verdict of guilty; some favored a verdict of not guilty; and 
other evidence favored neither.  Evidence that favored a verdict of guilty or not guilty as the 
first piece of evidence was manipulated.  Some participants were told the evidence came 
from the prosecution or the defense while others were not.  Results indicated that participants 
distorted information in the direction of the persuasive evidence presented first, regardless of 
whether or not they were told the source of the evidence.  A general reluctance to render a 
guilty verdict was also observed as roughly 74% of participants selected a verdict of not 
guilty.  The strong evidence location manipulation did not affect participants’ verdict in the 
case—despite the finding that the manipulation affected evidence evaluation and evidence 
evaluation was correlated with participants’ verdict.  Overall, this study demonstrated that 
information is distorted in predictable ways, even when presented in a persuasive context and 
when the information strongly favored the selection of one option over the other. 
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Predecisional Information Distortion of Trial Evidence:  
Biased Processing Under Persuasion 
 Often in life we are presented with situations in which we must decide among a 
number of possible alternatives.  These decisions often are presented to us by a party with 
some vested interest (e.g., a sales clerk, a lobbyist, a representative of a software company).  
This is especially true in situations where objectivity and truthfulness are inherent and upheld 
values of the setting.  One such venue to which this applies is that of the courtroom.  A fair 
trial by jury comes with the goal that, among other things, jurors evaluate evidence in an 
unbiased and probative manor (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Kerstholt & Jackson, 1998; Lawson, 
1968; Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Simon, 2004).  In order to do so, a general forfeiture of 
previous bias and subjectivity in decision makers is encouraged by juror instruction (Simon, 
2004).  As legal decisions should derive naturally from prescriptive forms of logic (Simon, 
2004), an expectation of rational decision-making is present for the rulings of deciding 
bodies in the court.  While the settling of disputes in an unbiased and rational fashion is the 
primary function of the court, this must be accomplished while also incorporating the 
arguments and evidence from two opposing sides.  Furthermore, each side is differentially 
motivated to present their argument in a way that favors their respective case. 
The goal of jurors or judges in the court is to come to an objective decision.  As a 
growing body of research suggests, people will attempt to resist actively targeted persuasive 
arguments, such as those presented in the court, by bolstering their previously held beliefs 
(Wood & Quinn, 2003).  The task of jurors comes with it a twofold responsibility: jurors 
must interpret persuasive information in an unbiased manner and then use this information to 
make a decision without subjectivity.  Considering this, a conundrum exists for jurors in that 
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an objective decision must be made from subjective and persuasive information.  As a result, 
these decisions may not represent the least biased interpretation of events submitted in legal 
proceedings.  
A great deal of research has been conducted describing the manner in which jurors 
make decisions (e.g., Carlson & Russo, 2001; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Kerstholt & Jackson, 
1998; Lawson, 1968; Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Simon, 2004).  Some of this research has 
examined the processes involved in jurors’ interpretation of evidence in legal proceedings 
and whether these interpretations are biased in systematic and predictable ways (Carlson & 
Russo, 2001; Holyoak & Simon, 1992; Kerstholt & Jackson, 1997; Pennington & Hastie, 
1992; Simon, 2004).  However, there is a limited amount of research describing how people 
interpret information when they are targets of persuasive attempts (for review see Benoit, 
1998; Eagley & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Wegner, 1998; Wood & Quinn, 2003).  Therefore, I 
investigated how participants interpret persuasive information in the context of a court case 
in which evidence is presented from the inherently persuasive and opposing positions of the 
prosecution and defense.  I predicted that, in line with previous research, participants would 
perceive information in a biased manner, despite being aware they were targets of persuasive 
attempts and having the goal of making an unbiased decision.  
The Story Model of Juror Decision Making 
One dominant explanatory theory of juror decision making is known as the Story 
Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1992).  This model suggests that when evaluating evidence, 
jurors apply a narrative story to the evidence in order to make sense of the events.  Central to 
the formation of this story is the consideration of the relationship between purposeful and 
causal events.  This story then plays a guiding role in the selection of a final verdict 
INFORMATION	  DISTORTION,	  BIAS	  UNDER	  PERSUASION	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
 
	  
(Pennington & Hastie, 1992).  Some of the inferences involved in the construction of the 
story may be attributable to the presentations by the prosecution or the defense, while others 
may be attributable only to the juror (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). 
While jurors may construct and consider multiple stories, the one that satisfies certain 
qualities of coherence will dominate the others.  Pennington and Hastie (1992) define 
coherence of a story as consisting of three separate parts.  The first, consistency, is the degree 
to which the pieces of information in the story do not logically conflict or contain internal 
disagreements.  The second is completeness, the degree to which all the parts of the story are 
present.  And the third, plausibility, is the degree to which the events of the story agree with 
or contradict real or imagined events in the world.  The story created by the juror in the 
process of making sense of evidence that most embodies these three attributes will be 
represented as the most coherent sequence of events.  If this story in the juror’s mind 
suggests guilt or innocence, the juror will then render that verdict. 
Pennington and Hastie (1992) note that many of the elements of the story that a juror 
might construct will consist of true events presented during the trial.  However, the story will 
also be influenced by inferences made by the jurors while they are evaluating the evidence.   
The story model of juror decision making provides a conceptual framework for how jurors 
interpret and order information, but it does not specifically elaborate upon ways in which 
information is transformed as a part of the understanding process.  Furthermore, it does not 
elaborate upon the underlying mechanisms involved in the interpretation and processing of 
information.  The story model merely describes that jurors attempt to organize the 
information they receive during a trial to create a coherent story.  In order to create a more 
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complete understanding of the ways in which information is processed when making a 
decision, we must understand the evaluation processes that occur during decision-making. 
Cognitive Consistency and Coherence Models of Decision-Making 
 Another line of research that describes the way information is perceived and 
transformed in order to make a decision is that of Cognitive Coherence theories.  These 
theories posit that information involved in complex decisions becomes unconsciously 
transformed in order to support a coherent, consistent emerging argument or decision.  This 
occurs as a part of the perception and deliberation process, so that a once difficult choice 
between two similar alternatives has been changed to represent a choice between a now 
strong leading alternative and weaker opposing alternative (Gräns, 2010; Holyoak & Simon, 
1999; Simon, 2004; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998).  
The changes in the perception of information are the result of two things: Coherence 
in the decision process and the constraints on the decision (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 
2004).  Regarding the latter, Holyoak and Simon (1999; see also Simon, 2004; Thagard & 
Verbeurgt, 1998) suggest that when people make a decision, they are aware that a certain 
constraint or constraints must be satisfied for the decision to be considered complete.  That is 
various decisions have different final options available, and in order to make a decision, one 
must select from the available options (Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998).  The process of making 
a decision according to its constraints, or following the rules of the decision, is known as 
constraint satisfaction.  For example when deciding between restaurants for a meal, the 
selection of a hardware store would not complete the decision.  The decision is constrained in 
that final selection must be from the category “restaurants,” and a successful decision has not 
been made until a selection (a restaurant) that satisfies the decisional constraint is selected.  
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According to Holyoak and Simon (1999), the goal of making a decision that does not violate 
the rules of that decision domain is one antecedent to the cognitive restructuring that occurs 
during the deciding process.  
A second antecedent is the principle of coherence.  Research suggests that when 
evaluating information, people will categorize the pieces according to how easily they fit 
together (cohere) conceptually (Simon, 2004; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998).  As information 
is represented in the mind, it may cohere or incohere with other pieces of information 
according to concepts such as induction, deduction, explanation, compatibility, 
incompatibility, association, disassociation, etc. (Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998).   For example, 
the assertion that Patrick went to the store to return some videotapes at 4:00 P.M. and that 
Patrick was at the scene of a crime at 4:00 P.M. incohere in that they do not agree logically.  
In order to enhance the coherence of information, people might change their interpretations 
of said information (Simon, 2004).   
In short, coherence-based models suggest that the goal of satisfying constraints drives 
the evaluation of information so that it is restructured according to the principle of coherence.  
The restructuring of the mental representations of information during the decision process is 
known as a coherence shift (Simon, 2004).  As a result of these coherence shifts, the 
information about the problem will gradually be restructured to support an emerging decision 
until a formerly complex and challenging decision is transformed so that a choice may be 
rendered more easily and with more confidence (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 2004).   
 While coherence shifts have been empirically observed in numerous contexts, the 
specific nature and extent of such shift remains unelaborated.  Cognitive consistency models 
improved upon the Story Model of juror decision making in that they specify that 
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information will be restructured to form a coherent story.   However, what is missing from 
this understanding is the exact way and the extent to which the mental representation of the 
information is changed in the mind due to these coherence shifts.  Another body of literature 
rooted in the evaluation of product information has succeeded in developing a paradigm 
capable of articulating moment-by-moment changes in interpretations of information during 
a decision. This body of literature refers to these shifts in coherence during the decision 
process as predecisional information distortion and allows shifts in the perception of 
information towards coherence with a decision to be observed.  
Predecisional Information Distortion 
 Research into predecisional information distortion shares many similarities with 
cognitive coherence and consistency literature.  Both strive to explain changes in the mental 
representation of information in a decision task.  However, the information distortion 
literature differs in the specificity it provides on the magnitude and direction of the distortion 
of each individual piece of information in the decision process.   
Information distortion is often measured using the Stepwise Evolution of Preference 
(SEP) method (Meloy & Russo, 2004; Russo et al., 2008).  While the entire SEP method is 
not necessary to measure the distortion of information during decisions, pieces of it are used 
in nearly every study of information distortion (e.g., Carlson, Meloy & Russo, 2006; Carlson 
& Russo, 2001; Meloy & Russo, 2004; Russo, Carlson, & Meloy, 2006).  The SEP method 
consists of two crucial components.  The first component is that each piece of information 
about a possible choice is presented one at a time.  The second component is that after the 
presentation of each piece of information, three questions are asked.  First, the decision 
maker is asked to report his or her evaluation of the information to the extent that it favors 
INFORMATION	  DISTORTION,	  BIAS	  UNDER	  PERSUASION	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  
 
	  
one decision or another.  In a decision between two alternatives, such as a jury trial where a 
decision between guilty and not guilty must be rendered, participants might respond using a 
scale anchored on each end by the extent to which the information favored the selection of 
guilty or not guilty.  Second, a question is asked that is designed to evaluate the current 
leader in the selection process of available options.  For example, a decision maker might be 
asked if he or she is leaning towards a verdict of guilty or not guilty.  Finally, the decision 
maker indicates his or her confidence that the currently leading choice will ultimately be the 
one selected after all information has been viewed.    
To illustrate the SEP method, imagine that a decision maker must decide between two 
different cars.  The decision maker would be given numerous pieces of information about the 
cars.  For example, he might be told that Car A has 300 horsepower and gets 19 miles per 
gallon while Car B has 280 horsepower and gets 23 miles per gallon.  The decision maker 
would then indicate the extent to which this information favored the selection of Car A or 
Car B.  The decision maker would then indicate which of the cars he was leaning towards 
selecting as his final choice.  Next, the decision maker would indicate his confidence that his 
current leader would end up being the one ultimately selected after all the information about 
the two cars has been viewed.  This process would be repeated for each new piece of 
information concerning the two models of cars.  Finally, the decision maker would render a 
decision by choosing one of the car models and then indicate his confidence that he made the 
“correct” selection (Meloy & Russo, 2004).  
 The SEP method allows for a step-by-step consideration of information during the 
process of making a decision.  As described earlier, Cognitive Coherence theories predict 
that as an initial leader comes to dominate a decision process, a decision maker’s mental 
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representation of information will change to cohere with this initial leaning.  Because the 
SEP method takes measures at each information presentation, it allows for a quantification of 
this process.  Further support for the relevance of Cognitive Coherence models of decision-
making as they relate to Information Distortion comes from an explanation proposed and 
tested by Russo et al. (2008).  With the use of a subliminal priming technique, Russo and 
colleagues demonstrated that the goal of consistency during the decision process led to 
predictable distortions of information.  Russo et al. (2008) concluded that consistency is a 
causal driving force behind the distortion of information.  This finding parallels that of 
Cognitive Coherence models of decision making that suggest that coherence (sometimes 
referred to as consistency) drives the shift in interpretation of information (Simon, 2004). 
 Using some form of the SEP method, information distortion has been observed in a 
number of contexts.  Studies have demonstrated the distortion of information when deciding 
between brands of products (Russo, Meloy, & Medvec, 1998), between restaurants and hotels 
(Russo et al., 1996), when evaluating a single option with no alternatives (Bond et al., 2007), 
when making a decision on behalf of another (Polman, 2010), when evaluating risky choices 
and probabilities (DeKay, Patino-Echeverri, & Fishbeck, 2009; DeKay, Stone, & Miller, 
2011; DeKay, Stone, & Sorenson, 2011), and in mock jurors’ interpretations of pieces of 
evidence (Carlson & Russo, 2001).  
Many information distortion studies evaluate how the biased interpretation of 
information can arise during the decision process.  However, it has also been demonstrated 
that this process can be manipulated with the purpose of altering the outcome of a decision. 
For example, Carlson et al. (2006) showed that by manipulating the sequence of the 
presentation of various attributes so as to establish an early preference for one choice over 
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another, it was possible to affect which product a consumer would ultimately choose.  In one 
of their studies, they had people make a choice between two similarly attractive backpacks.   
All of the participants evaluated the same information regarding both backpacks, but they 
evaluated the information in one of two orders.  In one order, favorable information 
concerning one backpack was presented in the first position while information favoring the 
other backpack was presented in the fourth position (of six). All other pieces of information 
in the sequence were neutral concerning which brand they favored. It was observed that not 
only did the placement of favorable information about one brand lead to its selection at 
significantly above chance levels but that the perception of the opposing piece of information 
in the fourth position was distorted to appear more favorable to the initial targeted brand. 
Russo et al. (2006) also showed that by using a similar type of attribute order 
manipulation, it was possible to increase significantly the number of persons who chose an 
objectively inferior alternative compared to its superior counterpart. These findings are 
compelling in that the inferiority of the alternative was dictated by each participant in a 
previous evaluation of individual preferences.  The manipulation was then implemented so 
that participants selected a product they previously evaluated as inferior in comparison to its 
alternative.  The selection of an inferior alternative is of particular interest in this context 
considering the relative neutral value of the information typically used in information 
distortion studies and the SEP method.  That decision makers could be manipulated into 
interpreting neutral information as being supportive of one decision or another is of concern.  
The studies described above concern relatively innocuous situations of biased 
interpretations of information.  A context in which information distortion might have more 
dire consequences is that of the legal world.  Carlson and Russo (2001) identified 
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information distortion in mock jurors.  This highlights a particularly troubling situation in 
which individuals involved in legal proceedings, situations founded upon rational unbiased 
decision making, showed biased information processing of trial evidence (Carlson & Russo, 
2001; see also, Lawson, 1968; Simon, 2004).  To assess this, Carlson and Russo (2001) used 
a modified version of the SEP method in the context of both a civil and a criminal court case. 
Participants were given instructions to interpret the information presented to them as they 
would in real court proceedings, basic background information, and then evaluated the 
information of civil and criminal proceedings.  Two different samples underwent the same 
procedure.  One sample was made up of undergraduate students while the other was made up 
of individuals selected for jury duty who had just undergone juror orientation.  Not only was 
the distortion of trial evidence observed, those selected for jury duty distorted information at 
nearly twice the magnitude of the student mock jurors (Carlson & Russo, 2001). 
While information distortion has been observed in legal contexts, Carlson and 
Russo’s (2001) investigation of this phenomenon is limited.  Specifically, the information 
presented to potential jurors was ambiguous in nature—that is, none of the information 
clearly supported the prosecution or defense.  Not only is this unrealistic in court proceedings, 
but it may have served to exaggerate the amount of distortion observed in this study.  
Furthermore, in a trial setting, evidence is presented by parties who have motivation to sway 
the jurors, and as Wood and Quinn (2003) commented, people may resist persuasion attempts 
when they are aware that they are the targets of those attempts—a factor that may deflate the 
overall distortion of the perception of trial evidence.  Additionally, the manner in which 
strong pieces of evidence may influence the distortion of subsequent information in this 
context is a matter unaddressed.  An application of a step-by-step method observing the 
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decisional process in a persuasive context with non-neutral information is absent from 
literature concerning decisional processes.  
Current Study 
The goal of the present study was to assess the extent to which information distortion 
will be observed in the evaluation of legal evidence as presented by parties motivated to 
supply persuasive information (the prosecution and defense) and to examine if this 
information distortion will affect final verdict selection.  This was accomplished by 
manipulating the order of evidence, as well as participants’ knowledge of the source of the 
evidence (i.e., while all participants saw the same evidence, some were aware of the source 
of the information while others were not).  
Six pieces of evidence were presented to participants.  One of these pieces strongly 
favored the prosecution (i.e., a verdict of guilty) while another strongly favored the defense 
(i.e., a verdict of not guilty).  The remaining four pieces were neutral in that they did not 
support either the prosecution or defense.  Participants evaluated the extent to which they felt 
each piece of evidence favored a verdict of guilty or not guilty, indicated their current leaning 
in their decision process as well as their confidence that their current leaning would be their 
final decision.  This process was repeated for each piece of evidence until all had been 
evaluated.  The participants then rendered their final verdict decision regarding guilty or not 
guilty.  
In order to install an initial leader in the decision process the pieces of evidence that 
strongly favored the prosecution and the defense were always placed as the first and last 
pieces participants evaluated, separated by the four neutral pieces.  Half of the participants 
were randomly assigned to see the prosecution-favoring evidence first (and the defense-
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favoring last) while the other half saw the reverse order.  Similarly, in order to assess the 
effects of the participant being aware they were the target of a persuasive attempt, half of the 
participants were randomly assigned to see information indicating that the first three pieces 
of evidence they evaluated were from the source with the corresponding argument (source 
information regarding the prosecution always accompanied the strong prosecution piece of 
evidence).  The source and corresponding evidence order were never mismatched.  
I hypothesized that participants would distort information to be consistent with the 
first piece of evidence they received.  For example, if a person is presented with persuasive 
evidence from the defense first, he or she will perceive later evidence from either party as 
being more supportive of the defense’s case.  Furthermore, I hypothesized that after installing 
an initial leader, an equally persuasive yet opposing argument presented at the end of the 
sequence would be perceived in a distorted manner.  
Method 
Participants 
 The IRB board approved research with human participants on 4/8/2013, see Appendix 
A for approval documents.  Using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service 301 (46.7% female, 
0.3% did not respond, Mage = 39.82 years, SDage  = 14.26 years) were recruited. They were 
compensated $0.50 each for their participation.  
Design 
The general research design was a 2 (Strong Evidence Location: defense first vs. 
prosecution first) x 2 (Source Information: present vs. absent) x 6 (Evidence Position) mixed 
factorial design with Strong Evidence Location and Source Information being between 
subjects factors and Evidence Position being a within subjects factor.   
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Materials 
Evidence selection and diagnosticity of the evidence.  The pieces of evidence used 
in the experimental procedure were selected from a larger pool of items.  In order to identify 
evidence that was relatively neutral, favored the defense, and favored the prosecution, a 
sample of 12 pieces of evidence was created and pilot tested.  One hundred thirteen students 
at Appalachian State University, for partial fulfillment of undergraduate research 
requirements, reviewed the evidence (see Appendix A for IRB documentation).  Four sets of 
three pieces of evidence were created from the original 12 and participants were randomly 
assigned to see one of the four evidence sets (i.e., each participant evaluated three pieces of 
evidence).  In order to avoid distortion during the evidence evaluation process, for any given 
participant, each piece of evidence was presented with a different case background and 
circumstance, and the pieces of evidence were presented in a random order.  The participants 
evaluated each piece of information on the extent to which it favored a verdict of guilty or 
not guilty on a scale from 1 (strongly suggests not guilty) to 9 (strongly suggests guilty). 
Based on the results of the pilot study, six pieces were selected, four for their neutral 
indication and two for their favor of the prosecution and defense respectively (see Appendix 
B).  
In order to assess information distortion during a decision process, it was important 
that ratings of the evidence were secured when participants were not in the act of considering 
pieces for a final decision.  This way, the ratings of the pieces of evidence given individually 
indicate the objective extent to which each piece favors a final verdict of guilty or not guilty. 
This is termed diagnosticity.  Deviation from these objective values observed during a 
decision process can be considered biased as a result of the process.  To provide these 
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objective comparison evaluations, the six pieces selected were assessed by a sample drawn 
from the same population as the experimental group—these participants constituted our 
control condition.  One-hundred six individuals (Mage = 34.96 years, SDage = 9.33 years, 49% 
female) were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were compensated $.50 for 
their participation (see Appendix A for IRB documentation).  Each participant saw the six 
pieces of evidence in a random order, each presented with a different background, accused 
crime, and named individual (so as to avoid distortion polluting evaluation of the pieces of 
evidence, see Russo et al., 1996 for a similar procedure for obtaining unbiased evaluations). 
Similar to the evidence selection sample, participants in this control condition indicated on 
the same one to nine scale described above the extent to which they felt the evidence favored 
a final verdict of guilty or not guilty.  The average of the rating per question were used as 
objective indicators of the diagnosticity of each item (see Appendix B for these means).  
Individual difference measures.  In order to assess the effects a participant’s attitude 
towards the justice system could have on their evaluation of the evidence, the Juror Bias 
Scale, JBS, (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983) was administered after the evidence was evaluated.  
The JBS assesses pre-existing attitudes participants had concerning the legal process and 
proceedings therein.  This scale asks participants to indicate how much they agree with 
prosecution (e.g. “A suspect who runs from the police most probably committed the crime.”) 
and defense-endorsing statements (e.g. “The death penalty is cruel and inhumane.”).  
Additionally the need for cognition scale, NFC, (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) was 
used in order to gain a measurement of the participants’ preference for effortful cognition.  
This scale asks participants to indicate how much they agree with statements that favor 
effortful thought when problem solving (e.g. “I really enjoy a task that involves coming up 
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with new solutions to problems”) or the rejection of effortful thought (e.g. “Learning new 
ways to think doesn’t excite me very much”).   
 Procedure  
Before beginning the study participants viewed an informed consent document (see 
Appendix C).  After selecting that they agreed to participate, they were shown a statement 
designed to evaluate if they were reading the information presented them.  To evaluate if 
participants were attending to directions, they were shown a passage which discussed the 
importance of following instructions, (see Appendix D).  Below this passage was a fill in the 
blank question asking “What is your favorite sport?” Within the passage were explicit 
instructions to ignore the sports questions and instead to type “I have read these instructions.”  
The response to this item was used as a way to evaluate the attentiveness of the participant 
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009).  
After the attention check, participants were given instructions that they were to act as 
jurors evaluating evidence in a criminal trial assessing the guilt or innocence of a 
hypothetical scenario in which a gentleman, Mr. S, is accused of embezzlement from the 
computer components manufacturing company for which he works.  After reading 
instructions and background information (see Appendix E), the participants were presented 
with six pieces of evidence (see Appendix B for a list of the pieces of evidence).  The first 
and last pieces of evidence had persuasive valence for opposing sides.  Half of the 
participants saw the pieces of evidence in the order of 1 through 6 (i.e., they saw the piece 
that strongly favored the defense first and the piece that strongly favored the prosecution last).  
The other half of the participants saw the pieces of evidence in the opposite order (i.e., they 
saw the piece that strongly favored the prosecution first and the piece that strongly favored 
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the defense last).  Participants in the source information present condition were told that 
pieces of evidence 1-3 came from the defense and pieces 4-6 came from the prosecution.  
Participants in the source information absent condition saw the same pieces of evidence and 
presentation order, but were not told which side provided each piece of evidence and were 
therefore unaware of the source of the evidence. 
Following the presentation of each piece of evidence, participants were asked to 
assess the extent to which they felt the evidence favored a verdict of guilty or not guilty (1 = 
Favors Not Guilty, 9 = Favors Guilty), whether they currently were leaning towards a verdict 
of guilty or not guilty (binary choice of guilty or not guilty), and how confident they were 
that their current verdict will also be their final verdict (1 = Not at all confident, 9 = Very 
confident) (see Appendix F for the exact measures).  After all pieces of evidence were 
evaluated, the participants rendered a final verdict followed by a final measure of confidence 
that their final verdict was the correct decision (1 = Not Confident, 9 = Very confident).  The 
participants then filled out NFC (Cacioppo et al., 1984), the JBS (Kassin & Wrightsman, 
1983), and indicated their age, education level, and gender.  Following the administration of 
these questions, the participants were debriefed, thanked, and compensated for their 
participation.  
Results 
Evidence Evaluation 
For all analyses reported, I excluded 36 participants (12% of the sample) who failed 
the attention check (conclusions made from analyses did not differ depending upon the 
exclusion of these participants).  In order to address my primary hypothesis that participants 
would distort their evaluation of the pieces of evidence in the direction of the initial 
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persuasive information, it was first necessary to evaluate the differences in the experimental 
group’s evaluation of the evidence compared to the unbiased control group.  To do this, a 
difference score was calculated for each piece of evidence the participants evaluated.  This 
difference score was obtained by subtracting the average value observed for a specific piece 
of evidence in the control group from the score each participant in the experimental group 
gave regarding whether the evidence favored a verdict of guilty or not guilty.  The resulting 
difference score indicates whether the participant evaluated the evidence to be more 
indicative of a guilty verdict (positive numbers) or a not guilty verdict (negative numbers) 
relative to the control group.  These difference scores were then analyzed in a 2 (Strong 
Evidence Location: defense first vs. prosecution first) X 2 (Source Information: present vs. 
absent) X 5 (Evidence Position) analysis of variance (ANOVA) where Strong Evidence 
Location and Source Information were between subjects factors and Evidence Position was a 
within subject factor.  While participants evaluated six pieces of evidence in total, only 
pieces seen in positions two through six were analyzed.  As the evaluation of the first piece 
of evidence is considered to be unbiased because participants are evaluating this piece in 
isolation and have not yet had an opportunity to distort the information.  Omission of the first 
evaluation of the sequence from the analysis is consistent with previous research (e.g., see 
Russo et al., 1996).  
Mauchly’s test indicated the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(9) = 60.90, 
p < .001, therefore Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom are reported.  As 
hypothesized, the ANOVA revealed a main effect of Strong Evidence Location, F(1, 261) = 
19.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .070.  Consistent with the hypothesis that distortion would differ as a 
function of the order of the strong evidence location, this analyses indicated that, on average, 
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distortion values favored the prosecution more strongly when participants saw evidence from 
the prosecution first as compared to the defense first. 
 A main effect of Evidence Position was also observed, indicating that the difference 
scores of the five pieces of evidence varied within participants, F(3.54, 922.79) = 3.29, p 
= .014, ηp 2= .012.  A Strong Evidence Location X Evidence Position interaction, F(3.54, 
922.79) = 14.78, p < .001, ηp 2= .034, was also found.  As shown in Figure 1, when 
participants saw evidence from the prosecution presented first, they tended to distort 
information increasingly in the direction of the prosecution.  When participants saw evidence 
favoring the defense first they distorted the information back and forth toward the defense 
and prosecution, alternating as they assessed the evidence.  Post hoc pairwise comparisons 
indicated that difference scores differed between the two Strong Evidence Location 
conditions for evidence presented at positions two (p < .001), four (p = .003), and six (p 
< .001), but not at positions three (p = .815) and five (p = .502). 
Additionally, a marginally significant and unexpected interaction between Evidence 
Position and Source Information was observed, F(3.53, 922.79) = 2.43, p = .054, ηp2 = .009. 
This interaction shows that participants evaluated pieces of evidence differently as a function 
of source information. As shown in Figure 2, participants distorted information increasingly 
toward the prosecution when they are not aware of the source of the information.  When 
informed of the evidence source, participants distorted most information in favor of the 
prosecution with the exception of fourth piece they saw.  This pattern suggests that when 
participants were not aware of the source of evidence presented, they tended to evaluate 
information as supportive of the prosecution.  When they were aware of the source 
information, they also tended to evaluate information as favoring the prosecution no matter 
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the order in which they saw the evidence.  However when the opposing source introduces 
information the first piece evaluated exhibits distortion towards the defense. 
No main effect of Source Information, F(1, 261) = .02, p = .888, ηp2 = .000, Strong 
Evidence Location X Source Information interaction, F(1, 261) = 1.30, p = .256, ηp2 = .005, 
or  Evidence Position X Strong Evidence Location X Source Information interaction, F(3.54, 
922.79) = 1.79, p = .137, ηp2 = .007, was observed.  
Confidence 
In addition to analyzing how participants evaluated the evidence, I also examined 
participants’ confidence that their current verdict after evaluating each piece of evidence 
would also be their final verdict.  Participants’ confidence that their current verdict would 
also be their final verdict was analyzed in a 2 (Strong Evidence Location) X 2 (Source 
Information) X 6 (Evidence Position) ANOVA with Strong Evidence Location and Source 
Information as between-subjects factors and Evidence Position as a within-subject factor. 
Mauchly’s test indicated the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(14) = .371.55, p 
< .001, therefore all tests are reported using Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of 
freedom.   
Tests of within subjects effects showed a main effect of  Evidence Position, indicating 
that average confidence changed between pieces of evidence as they were evaluated, F(2.99, 
781.34) = 6.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .025.  Within-subjects contrasts indicated a linear pattern 
described the change in confidence as information was evaluated, F(1, 261) = 11.67, p 
= .001, ηp2 = .043 (a quadratic pattern also described this effect but is presented as a 
secondary model).  The quadratic model was associated with a higher probability value and 
substantially smaller effect size, F(1, 261) = 5.19, p = .024, ηp2 = .019.  As shown in Figure 3, 
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overall, participants became more confident that their current verdict would also be their final 
verdict as they evaluated more evidence.  
No main effect of Strong Evidence Location was observed, F(1, 261) = 0.70, p = .403, 
ηp2 = .003.  Participants’ confidence did not change as a function of seeing strong evidence 
from the prosecution or defense first.  An interaction between Evidence Position and Strong 
Evidence Location was observed, F(2.99, 781.34) = 5.02, p = .002, ηp2 = .019.  As shown in 
Figure 3, if participants saw the evidence favoring the prosecution first, confidence tended to 
increase as the participant evaluated evidence.  However, confidence did not change 
systematically when participants saw evidence favoring the defense first. 
A marginally significant main effect of Source Information was present, F(1,261) = 
3.57, p = .060, ηp2 = .013.  Participants who were given source information regarding the 
evidence were slightly more confident in their current verdicts than those without source 
information (see Figure 4).  Tests of remaining two way interactions, Source Information X 
Strong Evidence Location, F(1,261) = 0.49, p = .483, ηp2 = .002, Current Verdict Confidence 
X Source Information, F(2.99, 781.34) = 0.89,  p = .445, ηp2 = .003, and three way 
interaction, Current Verdict Confidence X Source Information X Strong Evidence Location, 
F(2.99,781.34) = 0.63, p = .597, ηp2 = .002, were not significant. 
Distortion and Confidence 
Of additional interest was the relationship between participants’ confidence that their 
current verdict will be their final verdict and the amount of distortion they exhibit during the 
decision process.  To investigate this, confidence ratings across all pieces of evidence were 
averaged for each participant.  The difference scores taken by subtracting participants’ 
evaluations of each piece of evidence from the neutral control groups’ evaluations were 
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converted into absolute vales so that higher values would represent more distortion, 
irrespective of whether they favored a verdict of guilty or not guilty.  The absolute values 
were then averaged across pieces of evidence per participant.  Average confidence and 
average distortion were then correlated.  This analysis revealed a moderate correlation 
between distortion and confidence, r(263) = .38, p < .001.  This analysis indicates that 
increased levels of distortion were associated with increased confidence. 
Beyond examining if confidence was related to distortion in general, I also 
investigated if the absolute value of distortion at any point in the decision process predicted 
confidence at that same point in the process.  In order to properly model the possibly 
changing relationship between distortion and confidence as a function of point in time in the 
sequence of evidence evaluations a multilevel regression approach was employed.  Evidence 
position was treated as a fixed variable and the absolute value of distortion was treated as a 
random variable with unstructured covariance.  Tests of the fixed effect of evidence position 
indicated the absolute value of distortion predicted confidence when accounting for evidence 
position within and across participants, β = 0.07, t(1302.78) = 4.81, p < .001.  Estimates of 
covariance parameters for the random variable absolute value of distortion revealed that 
intercepts for the relationship between distortion and confidence varied across evidence 
position, β = 3.05, SE = 0.31, p < .001.  Covariance between intercepts and slopes for the 
relationship between absolute value of distortion and confidence was also significant, β = 
0.18, SE = 0.06, p = .004.  Variance of the slopes was not significant, β = 0.01, SE = 0.02, p 
= .623.  Taken together, these findings indicate that the relationship between absolute value 
of distortion and confidence changes as a function of the intercept.  Similarly, the 
relationship also varied significantly depending on evidence position.  As the betas for tests 
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of the random variable absolute value of distortion are all positive, this can then be 
interpreted as participants becoming more confident as a function of progressing evidence 
position and that the relationship between distortion and confidence increased as confidence 
increased.  
Verdict 
 Across all experimental conditions, 68 participants, (25.7% of the sample) rendered a 
guilty verdict.  This, of course, means that a vast majority (197 individuals or 74.3%) of the 
experimental sample rendered a final verdict of not guilty.  Binary logistic regression was 
used to test if level of Source Information, Strong Evidence Location, or the Source 
Information X Strong Evidence Location interaction predicted final verdict.  This analysis 
indicated that experimental group membership did not predict final verdict, χ2(3) = 1.88, p 
= .597, (Strong Evidence Location, β = 0.12, p = .763; Source Information, β = 0.36, p 
= .355; Source Information X Strong Evidence Location interaction, β = -0.648, p = .256). 
While Strong Evidence Location did affect evidence evaluation as show in the earlier 
analyses, it did not influence final verdict selection.  
This outcome was unexpected and raises the possibility that participants’ evidence 
evaluation was not related to their final verdict.  To test this, evidence evaluation was 
averaged across evidence per participant.  Average evidence evaluation was then regressed 
on final verdict.  The binary logistic regression revealed that average evidence evaluation 
predicted final verdict, χ2(1) = 59.95, p < .001, β = 1.62.  The model explained 29.8% 
(Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in final verdict and correctly classified 78.5% of final 
verdicts.  Increased average evidence evaluations (evaluations that on average were evaluated 
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as supporting a guilty verdict) were associated with increased likelihood of rendering a guilty 
verdict.  
As evidence evaluations significantly predicted final verdict selection I was also 
interested in whether the distortion of the evidence would predict final verdict.  The average 
of the absolute value of evidence difference scores (absolute value of distortion) was 
regressed on final verdict using binary logistic regression.  This regression revealed that the 
absolute value of distortion predicted final verdict decision, χ2(1) = 40.29, p < .001, β = 1.63.  
The model explained 20.7% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in final verdicts and correctly 
classified 76.6% of all final verdicts.   As the absolute value of distortion increased, so did 
the likelihood that a participant would render a final verdict of guilty.  Participants who 
exhibited more evidence distortion were more likely to render a final verdict of guilty.   
Participant Characteristics and Exploratory Analyses 
In addition to experimental variables of interest, a number of other individual 
difference measures and participant characteristic relationships were explored (see Table 1 
for correlations).  As a reminder, the JBS was used to assess preexisting attitudes participants 
may have had about the legal system by measuring their agreement with various prosecution 
and defense supporting statements.  The NFC was also employed to assess the amount that 
each participant enjoyed effortful thought and problem solving.  The JBS was negatively 
correlated with final verdict (lower JBS scores indicate prosecution favoring bias and final 
verdict was coded with 0 representing not guilty and 1 representing guilty).  Participants who 
displayed a prosecution bias tended to render a final verdict of guilty.  The JBS did not 
predict final verdict confidence.  The JBS was also negatively related to the average absolute 
value of distortion and average current verdict confidence.  As scores on the JBS increased 
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(defense favoring), the average absolute value of distortion and current verdict confidence 
decreased.  
As for Need for Cognition, NFC did not predict either final verdict or final verdict 
confidence.  There was, however, a significant positive relationship between the JBS and 
NFC.  Higher scores on the JBS (defense favoring) were associated with higher NFC 
(desiring more effortful thought and problem solving).  NFC was also negatively correlated 
with average current verdict confidence.  Higher current verdict confidence scores were 
associated with lower need for cognition scores.  Average current verdict confidence was 
positively correlated with final verdict confidence and final verdict.  Participants who were 
more confident in their current verdicts on average tended to be more confident in their final 
verdict as well.   
 Beyond experimental outcome relationships, other variables were also evaluated, and 
some findings of interest are reported.  Participant age and the absolute value of distortion 
were negatively correlated; older individuals exhibited smaller magnitudes of distortion. 
Participant age was negatively related to evidence evaluation scores; older individuals tended 
to evaluate the information as more indicative of not guilty.  Age was also negatively related 
to final verdict with older participants tending to render final verdicts of not guilty.  
Level of education was correlated with both the JBS and NFC.  More educated 
participants tended to be defense biased and desire effortful thought during problem solving. 
Finally, gender was related to evidence evaluation.  Female participants tended to evaluate 
information in favor of the defense.  
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Discussion 
I began with the hypothesis that participants would distort information in the direction 
of the strong persuasive information they saw presented at the beginning of a sequence of 
evidence.  I also hypothesized that participants would distort a diagnostic piece of evidence 
encountered at the end of the sequence in the direction of an initially encountered strong 
piece of evidence.  Drawing on the Story Model of Juror Decision Making (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1992), Cognitive Consistency/Coherence (e.g., Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 
2004; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998) and Predecisional Information Distortion (e.g., Carlson et 
al., 2006; Carlson & Russo, 2001; DeKay et al., 2009; DeKay et al., 2011; Meloy & Russo, 
2004; Russo et al., 2006) literatures, I developed and ran an experiment to test these 
hypotheses.  Participants were instructed to act as jurors and evaluated a sequence of mostly 
neutral evidence bookended by evidence that clearly favored the selection of guilty or not 
guilty, with or without knowing the source of the evidence.  In support of my hypotheses, I 
observed that evidence was reliably distorted in the direction of the strong evidence 
presented first in the sequence and that diagnostic evidence at the end of the sequence was 
distorted towards the initially encountered strong evidence.  When strong evidence 
supporting a verdict of guilty (favoring the prosecution) was presented in the first position, 
participants’ distortion of the evidence trended towards the prosecution.  When strong 
evidence supporting a verdict of not guilty (favoring the defense) was presented first, 
participants alternated their distortion between the prosecution and the defense. 
While this distortion did not predict a final verdict, participants distorted evidence to 
support the evidence they first evaluated.  Importantly, this occurred when evaluating neutral 
evidence as well as evidence that opposed the evidence participants first saw.  That is, 
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participants evaluated an argument of equal and opposite strength to the first one encountered 
as being more aligned with the first presented evidence.  This is of concern considering 
participants were instructed to evaluate information in an unbiased manner, and that the legal 
context implies rational decision making (Carlson & Russo, 2001; see also, Lawson, 1968; 
Simon, 2004).  
Of further interest and a peculiar finding was the marginal effect that source 
information had on the direction of distortion.  Participants who were not given information 
regarding which side (prosecution or defense) had presented the evidence in the trial tended 
to distort the evidence increasingly in favor of the prosecution.  However, those who were 
given source information distorted all pieces of information in favor of the prosecution 
except the fourth piece encountered.  It is important to note that for all conditions the fourth 
piece of evidence represents the half way point of the decision process.  It was at this point 
that participants with source information were told that the next pieces of evidence would be 
presented by the opposing side (i.e., if they previously saw arguments said to be presented by 
the prosecution, evidence four was the first one said to come from the defense).  It is 
intriguing that participants evaluated this piece of evidence on average as more favoring a 
verdict of not guilty (defense).  The reason for this effect of source information on evidence 
evaluation is unclear. 
Confidence was also observed to increase as the decision making progressed.  On 
average, participants became increasingly more confident that their verdict leaning at each 
evidence evaluation would also be their final verdict.  However, when evaluating the final 
piece of evidence (which favored the opposing verdict to the one first seen) participants’ 
confidence was diminished.  As the final piece of evidence opposed the initial evidence 
INFORMATION	  DISTORTION,	  BIAS	  UNDER	  PERSUASION	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  
 
	  
presented, this decrease in confidence is not surprising and serves as an indication that 
participants were properly attending to the evidence and evaluation tasks.  Interestingly, this 
decrease in confidence in the final position was not associated with decreased distortion as 
evidence in the final position was distorted the most strongly.  
On average, confidence increased as the decision progressed; however, different 
patterns were observed depending on which piece of evidence was evaluated at the beginning 
of the series.  Participants who saw evidence favoring a verdict of guilty (the prosecution) 
first tended to increase their confidence as they evaluated the final pieces of evidence.  This 
was not true for those who saw evidence favoring a verdict of not guilty (the defense) first. 
For these participants, current verdict confidence tended to waver back and forth in a 
reasonably flat trend, not increasing or decreasing in a predictable way.  
There was also a marginally significant effect of source information on current 
verdict confidence.  Participants who were informed as to which side presented the evidence 
tended to be slightly more confident in their verdict leanings for all evidence pieces than 
those who saw no information regarding the source of the evidence.  This relationship was 
not hypothesized but is a noteworthy finding.  It is possible that considering the persuasive 
intent of each side in presenting the evidence resulted in participants bolstering their personal 
beliefs as a reaction to the persuasive nature of the prosecution or defense (Wood & Quinn, 
2003).  An alternate and possibly complementary explanation is that participants became 
more confident in their current verdict as they acquired more information, even without 
becoming more accurate, a finding previously observed by Tsai and colleagues (Tsai, 
Klayman, & Hastie, 2008).  It may also be that when participants saw source information, 
this provided context for a story they created to make sense of the evidence (Pennington & 
INFORMATION	  DISTORTION,	  BIAS	  UNDER	  PERSUASION	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  
 
	  
Hastie, 1992).  This context may have led to participants evaluating evidence so that it 
formed a coherent argument for one verdict resulting in greater confidence (Holyoak & 
Simon, 1999; Simon, 2004).  One or a combination of these explanations may account for 
this effect.  These explanations, however, are speculation at this point as tests of these 
hypotheses are outside the scope of this experiment.  
In this study, final verdict was not predicted by the experimental manipulation of the 
Strong Evidence Location.  This contrasts with previous investigations into information 
distortion that were able to affect a final decision by placing strong information supporting a 
choice at the beginning of a series of attributes (Carlson et al., 2006; Russo et al., 2006).  
While my experimental manipulations did not achieve the same effect, the average of 
evidence evaluation and the absolute value of distortion predicted participants’ final verdict.  
This indicates that participants who evaluated evidence to be supportive of a guilty or not 
guilty verdict rendered a final verdict consistent with that evaluation.  Furthermore, those 
who distorted the evidence more heavily were also more likely to render a final verdict of 
guilty.  
There are some important differences between the current study and previous 
research that should be considered in the context of present results.  Previous studies used 
neutral pieces of information after the initial strong information so that distortion of the 
information could be easily observed (Carlson et al., 2006; Russo et al., 2006). While the 
current study used neutral evidence after the first strong piece of evidence, the evidence 
series was bookended by a piece of evidence that was approximately equal in strength and in 
opposition to the first piece of evidence.  Also, and perhaps most importantly, the current 
study differs from those mentioned above in that the context of the legal system was used in 
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which participants were asked to render a verdict of guilty or not guilty.  This is compared to 
contexts in which participants were asked to choose between brands of backpack (Carlson et 
al., 2006) or between restaurants (Carlson et al., 2006; Russo et al., 2006).  The decision 
between brands of backpacks or between restaurants carries with it very little consequences 
other than perhaps a bit of buyer’s remorse.  On the other hand, rendering a verdict of guilty 
or not guilty is very important and carries with it additional risk of making a wrong decision.   
Considering this, it is possible that using leader-driven primacy to affect final choice is not 
powerful enough to result in participants making the corresponding verdict in a legal context.   
It is likely that participants were aware that the verdict of guilty and not guilty do not carry 
equal weights and do not have equal meanings (Gräns, 2010; Lawson, 1968; Simon, 2004). 
This awareness that the decisions are not equal and carry with them unequal risks (is it worse 
to set a guilty person free or imprison an innocent?) could be the culprit responsible for the 
low observed frequency of participants (26%) indicating guilty as their final verdict.  This 
inequality in final verdict selections may also be the result of ambiguity reintroduced into the 
decision process when participants evaluated an opposing strong piece of evidence in the 
final position, just before rendering a final verdict.  Encountering an opposing argument to 
the one they had previously seen (and were distorting information towards) may have 
changed a seemingly clear decision to an unclear one resulting in decreased confidence.  A 
decrease in confidence may have been associated with rendering a not guilty verdict because 
less confident participants may have felt that since they were now less sure of their decision, 
a less risky choice of not guilty was preferable. 
 In an effort to understand better the characteristics among participants associated 
with this decision as well as other variables of interest, exploratory analyses were conducted 
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yielding some interesting results.  The negative relationships between final verdict, Juror 
Bias Scale scores, average absolute value of distortion, and average current verdict 
confidence paint a picture in which a participant who evaluated the evidence in favor of the 
prosecution did so with more distortion, increased confidence, and tended to endorse 
prosecution biased statements.  These individuals also were more likely to render a guilty 
verdict, tended to desire less effortful thought while problem solving, and be younger.  
The findings of the experiment at present contribute to the legal and decision making 
literature by exhibiting that participants distorted information in the direction of the initially 
presented strong information when instructed to act as mock jurors.  While information 
distortion has been observed in the legal context previously (Carlson & Russo, 2001), it had 
not been observed as the result of strong evidence in the beginning of the presentation series. 
By manipulating whether the first presented evidence favored the prosecution or defense, I 
was able to demonstrate that later information will be distorted in the direction of initially 
presented strong information.  It is somewhat encouraging that this manipulation did not 
predict final verdict decisions.  Participants may have felt they had no choice but to render a 
verdict of not guilty as the end result of the decision process may have installed a state of 
ambiguity (the average of all the pieces of evidence rated by the control group indicates 
favoring neither verdict).  Faced with this ambiguity participants may have supplemented 
their evaluation of the evidence with their personal expectation of how the justice system is 
supposed to perform and their appraisal of the risk involved in the decision they were making.  
Considering that jurors’ evaluations of evidence during trial are a function of both the 
evidence and the jurors themselves (Lawson, 1968), this explanation is plausible. Conversely, 
it is of concern that participants who distorted information more were also more confident in 
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their current verdicts and more likely to render a final verdict of guilty.  Future studies could 
investigate this by examining the extent to which participants weighted evidence when 
rendering a verdict.  
The findings of my study replicate those of cognitive consistency and coherence 
literature in which individuals become more confident in their emerging decision as the 
process develops (Gräns, 2010; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 2004; Thagard & Verbeurgt, 
1998).  Participants were observed to become more confident as they evaluated more 
evidence and neared rendering their final verdict.  The relationship between the absolute 
value of distortion and confidence further strengthens this replication.  Distortion is 
conceptually a cognitive restructuring of information, and such distortion was observed to be 
associated with increases in confidence.  
While this study was able to observe distortion in the direction of an installed leader 
within the legal context, it also had limitations that constrained information gleaned from it. 
The experiment was designed so that participants would experience evidence presented in 
exactly opposite orders, bookended by strong pieces of evidence.  This design feature aided 
experimental control by keeping constant the order in which the evidence was evaluated, but 
in attempting to control for order effects, it may have inadvertently led to one.  To judge 
properly the extent to which diagnostic information would be distorted, it was necessary to 
place the equally strong and opposite evidence where distortion was hypothesized to be the 
most strong: at the end of the sequence.  Distortion was indeed observed to be largest for this 
point in the evaluation process despite the opposing diagnosticity of the evidence, but placing 
this diagnostic evidence directly before the final verdict decision may have affected the 
distribution of final verdicts by reducing participants’ confidence.  
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Future research into this topic should focus on the factors intrinsic to an individual 
that are associated with the distortion of information.  As increased distortion was associated 
with increased current verdict decision confidence and higher likelihood of rendering a final 
verdict of guilty, knowing the characteristics of a person that are associated with increased 
likelihood of distortion could have practical benefits.  For example this information could be 
crucial in the juror selection process.  A potential juror’s tendency to distort may be hard to 
measure during the selection process, but currently unknown predictors of distortion may be 
easy to observe.  Examples of these could include age, endorsements of prosecution biased 
statements, or indicators from other personality and individual difference measures not yet 
known to be associated with distortion.  This information could inform the prosecution to 
select these kinds of individuals inclined to distort and the defense to move for their 
dismissal.  
The extent to which participants distort information with both strong and persuasive 
information in the legal setting should also continue to be explored.  While this study was 
able to demonstrate distortion in the direction of initially presented strong information, this 
distortion did not predict final verdicts.  The decision of guilty or not guilty may be one that 
is not easily affected by the distortion process with the current configuration (i.e., case 
background, crime committed).  It is certainly possible that in cases where a more severe 
crime is being considered, more diagnostic evidence is used, types of evidence (physical vs. 
circumstantial), or qualities of the defendant are manipulated so that verdict selection may be 
reliably and intentionally influenced. 
The findings of my study have real-world implications in that the distortion of trial 
evidence by mock jurors was observed despite instruction and warning that jurors should 
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interpret the information without bias (see also, Carlson & Russo, 2001).  This bias in general 
appears to favor the first seen piece of strong information, indicating a decision one way or 
another.  Considering that the prosecution presents evidence first in criminal jury trials, this 
bias may currently affect the jury trial decision making process and increase the quality of 
the case the defense would need to counteract this effect.  This presentation order and 
corresponding bias may not represent the same “innocent until proven guilty” philosophy that 
the American legal system is founded on. 
In closing, this study expanded multiple decision making literatures (legal, coherence, 
information distortion) by observing that participants distorted their evaluations of evidence 
in a mock trial in the direction of an earlier piece of evidence that strongly favored the 
selection of one verdict over another.  This distortion happened despite the presence (or 
absence) of information indicating the persuasive source of the evidence during the trial.  
This distortion was associated with increased decision confidence.  Furthermore, the absolute 
value of distortion also predicted people’s final verdict.  Participants who distorted more 
were more likely to render a guilty verdict.  Further investigation into the factors associated 
with the tendency to distort information during decisions and how individuals distort 
information with strong and persuasive components is warranted.  
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Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between participant characteristics, evidence 
evaluation, evidence distortion, confidence, and final verdict. 
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. JBS 
(M=49.89, SD=8.24) .31*** .07 .01 .12* -.19** -.26*** -.16** -.31*** -.08 
1. NFC 
(M=7.89, SD=15.41) - -.04 -.04 .13** -.06 -.03 -.18** -.08 .02 
3.  Age  
(M=40.43, SD=14.12)  - .15* .07 -.33*** .15* -.06 -.16** .10 
4. Gender 
(47% Male, 53% Female)   - -.08 -.18** -.07 -.03 -.06 .08 
5. Education 
(M=4.22, SD=1.38)    - -.06 -.05 -.02 .02 -.10 
6. Evidence Evaluation 
(M=5.07, SD= .84)     - .33*** .19** .45*** -.10 
7. Absolute value of Evidence 
Distortion 
(M=1.06, SD=.58) 
     - .38*** .40*** .27*** 
8. Confidence in current verdict 
(M=4.66, SD= 1.92)       - .25*** .42*** 
9. Final verdict 
(74.3% Not Guilty, 25.7% Guilty)        - .06 
10. Final Confidence 
(M=5.88, SD= 2.07)         - 
Note: JBS = Juror Bias Scale; NFC = Need for Cognition; Gender: 1 = Male, 2 = Female; 
Final verdict: 0 = Not guilty, 1 = Guilty; Education: 1= Some High School, 2=High School 
Equivalent, 3=Some College, 4= 2 Year College Degree, 5= 4 Year College Degree, 5= 
Masters Degree, 6= Professional/ Doctoral Degree. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figure 1. Participants’ evaluation of pieces of evidence in terms of their deviation from 
control group values (distortion).  Split according to which strong piece of evidence was seen 
at position one.  Values above 0 indicate that the evidence was perceived to be more 
supportive of a guilty verdict while values below 0 indicate that the evidence was perceive to 
be more supportive of a not guilty verdict.  Error bars represent ±1 standard error.  
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Figure 2. Participants’ evaluation of pieces of evidence in terms of their deviation from 
control group values (distortion).  Split according to which strong piece of evidence was seen 
at position one.  Values above 0 indicate that the evidence was perceived to be more 
supportive of a verdict of guilty while values below 0 indicate that the evidence was perceive 
to be more supportive of a verdict of not guilty.  Error bars represent ±1 standard error.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.6 
-0.4 
-0.2 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
2 3 4 5 6 
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 c
on
tro
l g
ro
up
 e
va
lu
at
io
n 
Evidence Position 
Source information No source information 
INFORMATION	  DISTORTION,	  BIAS	  UNDER	  PERSUASION	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  
 
	  
 
 
Figure 3. Confidence that participants’ current verdict will also be their final verdict at each 
piece of evidence in the sequence on a 1-9 point scale, split according to which strong piece 
of evidence was seen at position one.  Error bars represent ±1 standard error. 
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Figure 4. Confidence that participants’ current verdict will also be their final verdict at each 
piece of evidence in the sequence on a 1-9 point scale, split by if the participants saw 
information regarding the source of the evidence in the trial.  Error bars represent ±1 standard 
error. 
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  Institutional	  Review	  Board	  Chairperson	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  4/08/2013	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  IRB	  Approval	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  Review	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  45	  CFR	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  #:	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  Title:	  Legal	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  Type:	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  Research	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  Characteristics	  or	  Behavior,	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  Surveys,	  
Interviews,	  etc.	  	  
Approval	  Date:	  4/08/2013	  	  
Expiration	  Date	  of	  Approval:	  4/07/2014	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  Institutional	  Review	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  the	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indicated.	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  been	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  that	  the	  risk	  involved	  in	  this	  research	  is	  no	  more	  than	  
minimal.	  	  
	  
Investigator’s	  Responsibilities:	  	  
	  
Federal	  regulations	  require	  that	  all	  research	  be	  reviewed	  at	  least	  annually.	  It	  is	  the	  
Principal	  Investigator’s	  responsibility	  to	  request	  renewal	  of	  approval	  before	  the	  
expiration	  date.	  You	  may	  not	  continue	  any	  research	  activity	  beyond	  the	  expiration	  date	  
without	  IRB	  approval.	  	  
	  
Any	  adverse	  event	  or	  unanticipated	  problem	  involving	  risks	  to	  subjects	  must	  be	  
reported	  immediately	  to	  the	  IRB.	  You	  are	  required	  to	  obtain	  IRB	  approval	  for	  changes	  
to	  any	  aspect	  of	  this	  study	  before	  they	  can	  be	  implemented	  except	  to	  eliminate	  apparent	  
immediate	  hazards.	  Best	  wishes	  with	  your	  research!	  	  
	  
CC:	  
Andrew	  Smith,	  Psychology	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  Stan	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  Review	  Board	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Date:	  4/17/2014	  
RE:	  Notice	  of	  IRB	  Approval	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  Review	  (under	  45	  CFR	  46.110)	  
Study	  #:	  13-­‐0216	  
	  
Study	  Title:	  Legal	  Decisions	  
Submission	  Type:	  Modification	  
Expedited	  Category:	  (7)	  Research	  on	  Group	  Characteristics	  or	  Behavior,	  or	  Surveys,	  
Interviews,	  etc.	  
Approval	  Date:	  4/17/2014	  
Expiration	  Date	  of	  Approval:	  3/19/2015	  	  
	  
The	  Institutional	  Review	  Board	  (IRB)	  approved	  the	  modification	  for	  this	  study.	  The	  IRB	  
found	  that	  the	  research	  procedures	  meet	  the	  expedited	  category	  cited	  above.	  IRB	  
approval	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  activities	  described	  in	  the	  IRB	  approved	  materials,	  and	  
extends	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  described	  activities	  in	  the	  sites	  identified	  in	  the	  IRB	  
application.	  In	  accordance	  with	  this	  approval,	  IRB	  findings	  and	  approval	  conditions	  for	  
the	  conduct	  of	  this	  research	  are	  listed	  below.	  	  
	  
Submission	  Description:	  	  
	  
	  No changes to study procedures or informed consent are made. In addition to 
collecting participants from the student sample participants will also be recruited 
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in order to increase ease of recruitment and 
to gather information about a non-student sample. Informed consent will be delivered 
digitally with no changes other than format.  MTurk is a site where potential 
participants can sign up for a variety of jobs—including participating in 
research.  MTurk assigns each participants an ID number, so, as researchers, we do 
not have access to any identifying information.  Furthermore, the online survey site 
will remain hosted by Qualtrics.com, so the participants MTurk ID number will not be 
associated with his/her survey responses.  The participants will receive $.50 for 
participating in the online survey.	  	  
	  
Regulatory	  and	  other	  findings:	  
	  
The	  IRB	  determined	  that	  this	  study	  involves	  minimal	  risk	  to	  participants.	  	  
	  
The	  IRB	  waived	  the	  requirement	  to	  obtain	  a	  signed	  consent	  form	  for	  some	  or	  all	  
subjects	  because	  the	  research	  presents	  no	  more	  than	  minimal	  risk	  of	  harm	  to	  subjects	  
and	  involves	  no	  procedures	  for	  which	  written	  consent	  is	  normally	  required	  outside	  of	  
the	  research	  context.	  	  
	  
Approval	  Conditions:	  	  
	  
Appalachian	  State	  University	  Policies:	  All	  individuals	  engaged	  in	  research	  with	  human	  
INFORMATION	  DISTORTION,	  BIAS	  UNDER	  PERSUASION	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  
 
	  
participants	  are	  responsible	  for	  compliance	  with	  the	  University	  policies	  and	  
procedures,	  and	  IRB	  determinations.	  	  
	  
Principal	  Investigator	  Responsibilities:	  The	  PI	  should	  review	  the	  IRB's	  list	  of	  PI	  
responsibilities.	  The	  Principal	  Investigator	  (PI),	  or	  Faculty	  Advisor	  if	  the	  PI	  is	  a	  student,	  
is	  ultimately	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  the	  protection	  of	  research	  participants;	  
conducting	  sound	  ethical	  research	  that	  complies	  with	  federal	  regulations,	  University	  
policy	  and	  procedures;	  and	  maintaining	  study	  records.	  	  
	  
Modifications	  and	  Addendums:	  IRB	  approval	  must	  be	  sought	  and	  obtained	  for	  any	  
proposed	  modification	  or	  addendum	  (e.g.,	  a	  change	  in	  procedure,	  personnel,	  study	  
location,	  study	  instruments)	  to	  the	  IRB	  approved	  protocol,	  and	  informed	  consent	  form	  
before	  changes	  may	  be	  implemented,	  unless	  changes	  are	  necessary	  to	  eliminate	  
apparent	  immediate	  hazards	  to	  participants.	  Changes	  to	  eliminate	  apparent	  immediate	  
hazards	  must	  be	  reported	  promptly	  to	  the	  IRB.	  	  
	  
Approval	  Expiration	  and	  Continuing	  Review:	  The	  PI	  is	  responsible	  for	  requesting	  
continuing	  review	  in	  a	  timely	  manner	  and	  receiving	  continuing	  approval	  for	  the	  
duration	  of	  the	  research	  with	  human	  participants.	  Lapses	  in	  approval	  should	  be	  avoided	  
to	  protect	  the	  welfare	  of	  enrolled	  participants.	  If	  approval	  expires,	  all	  research	  activities	  
with	  human	  participants	  must	  cease.	  	  
	  
Prompt	  Reporting	  of	  Events:	  Unanticipated	  Problems	  involving	  risks	  to	  participants	  or	  
others;	  serious	  or	  continuing	  noncompliance	  with	  IRB	  requirements	  and	  
determinations;	  and	  suspension	  or	  termination	  of	  IRB	  approval	  by	  external	  entity,	  must	  
be	  promptly	  reported	  to	  the	  IRB.	  	  
	  
Closing	  a	  study:	  When	  research	  procedures	  with	  human	  subjects	  are	  completed,	  please	  
complete	  the	  Request	  for	  Closure	  of	  IRB	  review	  form	  and	  send	  it	  to	  irb@appstate.edu.	  	  
	  
Websites:	  	  
	  
1.	  PI	  responsibilities:	  
http://researchprotections.appstate.edu/sites/researchprotections.appstate.edu/files/
PI%20Responsibilities.pdf	  	  
	  
2.	  IRB	  forms:	  http://researchprotections.appstate.edu/human-­‐subjects/irb-­‐forms	  	  
	  
CC: 
Andrew Smith, Psychology	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Appendix B 
Diagnosticity of Evidence from the Control Condition 
Number Type Evidence Mean SD 
1 
Strongly 
favors 
defense 
A receipt as well as a bank statement showed 
that Mr. S was eating lunch in a restaurant at 
the time the money was removed from the 
account via his office computer.  
2.87 1.50 
2 Neutral 
Mr. S aided in the prosecution of a former 
employee of the company whom had been 
accused of stealing in a similar manner. 
4.57 1.62 
3 Neutral 
There is little oversight as to Mr. S’s 
activities concerning movement of finances 
and payment of material providers. 
5.03 1.64 
4 Neutral 
Around the time the money went missing 
from the company, Mr. S had been staying to 
work late. 
5.58 1.03 
5 Neutral 
Mr. S has been in the bank where the 
company has its professional accounts 
numerous times around when the money went 
missing. 
5.92 1.50 
6 
Strongly 
favors 
prosecution 
The account from which the funds were 
withdrawn was created via Mr. S’s password 
protected computer in his company office. 
6.93 0.90 
 
Note: The top three pieces of evidence were said to come from the defense while the bottom 
three were said to come from the prosecution.  Evidence evaluation scores were obtained 
from the control condition (n = 106) where participants evaluated the evidence on a 
1(strongly favors a verdict of not guilty) to 9 (strongly favors a verdict of guilty) scale.   
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Appendix C 
Consent to Participate in Research: Information to Consider About this Research 
Legal Decisions 
Principal Investigator: Lindsay D. Marshall, 222 Joyce Lawrence Ln. Boone, NC 28608. (859)-230-
4165. Marshallld1@appstate.edu.  
Faculty Supervisor: Andrew R. Smith Ph.D smithar3@appstate.edu. 
Questions regarding the protection of human subjects may be addressed to the IRB Administrator, 
Research and Sponsored Programs, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608 (828) 262-2130, 
irb@appstate.edu 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study about the ways in which people make decisions 
in a legal setting.  By doing this study we hope to learn about the psychological mechanisms involved 
in decisions made in legal contexts.  You will be asked to read some short statements on the computer 
and then answer a few questions about each followed by a few questions about yourself.  
 
You cannot volunteer for this study if you are under 18 years of age as you must be at least 18 to 
participate in legal proceedings and the study is designed to assess psychological mechanisms of the 
population eligible to participate in the legal system. 
 
This procedure is anticipated to take roughly 25-30 minutes. 
 
What are the possible benefits and risks of the research? 
There may be no personal benefit from your participation but the information from this research may 
help others in the future to understand the ways in which decisions are made in certain contexts and 
could help society as a whole to better understand information processing in humans.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, the risk of harm for participation in this research study is no more than 
you would experience in everyday life. 
 
This study is anonymous.  That means that no one, not even members of the research team, will know 
that the information you gave came from you. 
 
Who can I contact if I have questions? 
The people conducting this study will be available to answer any questions concerning this research, 
now or in the future.  You may contact the Principal Investigator at  
Lindsay Marshall 
(859)-230-4165  
marshallld1@appstate.edu 
Do I have to participate?  What else should I know? 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  There will be no consequences if you 
choose not to volunteer or decide to stop participating at any time. 
 By continuing this study, I acknowledge that I am at least 18 years old, have read the above 
information, and provide my consent to participate under the terms above. 
This research project has been approved on 4/8/2013 by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 
Appalachian State University.  This approval will expire on 4/7/2014 unless the IRB renews the 
approval of this research.  
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Appendix D 
 
Attention Check Item 
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Appendix E 
Instructions:  
In this study you will be shown pieces of information from a legal case and you will be asked 
questions about the information you see. The legal case involves a man named Mr. S. who 
has been accused of a crime. Your job is to act as a juror in this case, analyze each argument 
for or against Mr. S., and ultimately come to a final verdict. You are to evaluate the 
information and decide if you think Mr. S. is guilty or innocent of a crime. Please carefully 
read all the information and answer all the questions as accurately and honestly as possible.  
 
The following instructions are given to jurors in actual trials.  You should follow these 
instructions during this study. 
 
Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Do not make up your mind about the verdict or any 
issue until after you have evaluated all of the evidence. Do not let bias, sympathy, or 
prejudice influence your decision. You must reach your verdict without any consideration of 
punishment. 
 
Case Background: 
Mr. S. is the Materials Acquisition and Distribution Manager for Company WCQ that 
manufactures various components for use in computers and other electronics. His job entails 
managing the finances required to purchase and organizing the delivery of raw materials 
necessary to complete the components at multiple manufacturing locations. He has been with 
the company for 15 years. He has been accused of theft in the amount of $20,000 from the 
company. On the following pages you will see pieces of evidence presented by the 
prosecution or defense during the case against Mr. S. 
 
 
INFORMATION	  DISTORTION,	  BIAS	  UNDER	  PERSUASION	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  
 
	  
 
 
 
Appendix F 
Questions that follow the presentation of each piece of evidence.  
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